Leading indicators of country risk and currency crises: the Asian experience by Marcelle Chauvet & Fang Dong
25 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2004
I
n recent years, capital restrictions in emerging
markets have been substantially reduced. As a
result, international financial flows to these
countries have risen. Most emerging markets
have adopted a pegged exchange rate system
in which central banks are committed to keep-
ing their domestic currency in terms of the U.S. dollar
within narrow bands. Under this system, a country can
finance a current account deficit from its reserves
or by borrowing from abroad. That is, the country
can buy time in handling external deficits without
decreasing the monetary base or reducing the public
deficit. Such a regime relies on a delicate balance and
makes a country vulnerable to shocks in mobile inter-
national capital markets, especially with respect to
outflows in bank deposits.
When international markets are relatively calm,
lenders may be willing to finance countries with
mildly weak fundamentals. As international conditions
deteriorate, however, investors’ perception about a
borrower’s creditworthiness may change. Economies
that look sound one moment seem riskier the next—
not necessarily because of new developments within
their borders but perhaps because interconnected
countries are in distress. As foreign investors become
more risk averse, they may withdraw short-term
investments and sell local currency. The country’s
central bank must then increase interest rates suffi-
ciently to dampen the outflow and avoid a collapse
of the pegged exchange rate system. The result of
such reactive strategies may be a credit crunch that
spreads from country to country, driving each into
economic recessions with high inflation.
In the last decade several developed and devel-
oping countries experienced currency crises. For
example, the European Monetary System (EMS) was
severely undermined by intense speculative pres-
sure in 1992–93, which led to the exit of Britain and
Italy in 1992. More recently, several emerging market
economies underwent large devaluations of their
currencies: Mexico in 1994, several Asian countries
in 1997, Russia in 1998, and, subsequently, Brazil in
1999, among others. These events cast a bleak out-
look for the global financial system and caused
widespread economic distress. Even the U.S. econ-
omy experienced slowdowns associated with these
international events, especially the Mexican and
Asian crises.
A “country risk” of currency crisis is not directly
observable, but prior currency pressures can be
detected in several sectors of the economy. In partic-
ular, financial variables reflecting investors’ expecta-
tions and banking distress are highly sensitive to
changes in the economic environment. This article
aims to construct an early warning system for inter-
national currency crises using such variables. The
system uses a dynamic factor model with regime
switching to construct leading indicators of country
risk and currency crises. In this model, an unobserv-
able factor switches regimes, representing periods
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and smooths out noise inherent in monthly data. This
smoothing reduces the likelihood of signaling false
turning points, which can be a significant problem in
the monthly frequency. Second, in contrast to com-
posite indicators that are constructed as weighted
averages of statistical transformations of their com-
ponents, the dynamic factor model takes into account
cross-correlations and potential long-term relation-
ships among the variables. Finally, the method yields
probabilities that can signal turning points in real
time. This method contrasts with the rules of thumb
used to build some composite indicators, which
require the use of substantial ex post data. Because
these rules are based on the unusual behavior of some
variables compared to their frequency distribution,
turning points can be identified and predicted only
a couple of months after their occurrence, which
undermines their usefulness for real-time forecasting.
Thus, the advantage of the proposed approach in
comparison with alternative models and rules of
thumbs is that it treats foreign exchange market
regimes as unobservable priors instead of observed
ex post events, and no ad hoc criterion is adopted in
determining the crisis state. Instead, the model gen-
erates regime probabilities from the leading indica-
tors that can be used to signal increases in country
risk and potential currency crises in real time.
The approach in this article implements several
linear and nonlinear methods to select the variables
composing the indicators. For the Asian countries
studied, the best candidates are monetary and
banking series. The study shows that the leading
indicators built from the nonlinear dynamic factor
model unveil, both in sample and out of sample,
early warning signals of an increase in the country
risk and subsequent depreciation of nominal
exchange rates experienced by Thailand, Indonesia,
and Korea, especially before the 1997 crisis. In gen-
eral, phases of the leading index exhibiting a higher
mean and volatility precede currency crises, whereas
the noncrisis state is associated with a lower mean
and volatility.
For all the countries studied, the regime proba-
bilities give early signals of the 1997 crisis and reveal
a contagion pattern. For Thailand, a crisis was sig-
naled six months earlier than the actual one. For
Indonesia, the probabilities indicated a crisis seven
months before the actual one, which was minimized
by preemptive government actions. However, once
Thailand’s currency crisis hit, the probability of a cri-
sis in Indonesia also increased substantially and thus
increased the probability of a crisis in Korea. This
finding suggests a contagion pattern that is being
further examined in ongoing projects.
of relative calmness and periods prone to currency
crises, using a two-state Markov process. The method
is applied to evaluate the model’s in-sample and
out-of-sample performance in anticipating currency
crises in the last two decades in Thailand, Indonesia,
and Korea. The dynamic factor index gives early dis-
tress signals of country risk and currency crisis, using
several financial and banking variables.
Leading indicators have been a successful fore-
casting tool adopted by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) since the work of Burns
and Mitchell (1946). New econometric models have
now been used to explore more formally potential
dynamic differences across cycle phases in several
variables. The method used to construct economic
indicators is distinct from econometric regression
methods. In particular, the goal is not to form a fore-
cast of exchange rates based on the information set.
Instead, leading indicators are indexes composed of
several variables, designed to give early signals of
major cyclical changes in exchange rates, particu-
larly the beginning and end of cyclical phases (that
is, their turning points). Variables that exhibit low
power in explaining the linear long-run variance of
exchange rates may be highly important in specific
situations. In fact, unusually large changes in some
variables at particular historical episodes—as
opposed to the linear average behavior of the series—
can be important independent factors in determin-
ing large exchange rate devaluations.
A large theoretical and empirical literature aims
to characterize or forecast the recent experiences
of currency crises.1 Few of these studies, however,
focus on forecasting turning points representing
episodes of speculative attacks.
The method this study uses to construct indicators
differs from the previous currency crisis literature in
several ways. First, since currency crises are caused
by different shocks over time, the inclusion of differ-
ent variables increases the model’s ability to signal
future crises. In addition, the combination of variables
reduces measurement errors in the individual series
This article constructs an early warning system
for international currency crises using financial
variables that reflect investors’ expectations
and banking distress.1. See, for example, the list of more than 100 recent papers and books related to the NBER Project on Exchange Rate Crises in
Emerging Market Countries at <www.nber.org/crisis> or the reference list at <www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro>. 
2. State-owned banks in Indonesia and Korea were regularly allowed to break many prudential regulations without penalty.
3. During the 1984:11–1985:03 period, Thailand abandoned a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar. The central bank abolished
general credit restrictions but reimposed restrictions on bank lending rates and lowered the ceiling for loans to priority sectors
(see Bekaert and Harvey 1999).
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The article first discusses the currency crises
experienced by the Asian countries studied. The
discussion then presents the data and statistical
analysis used to select the leading variables, pre-
sents the dynamic factor model used to construct
the leading indicators, and reports the in-sample
and out-of-sample empirical results.
Currency Crises in Asia
R
adelet and Sachs (1998) study the broad features
underlying the recent experiences of currency
crises in Asian countries. One striking finding is that
typical international and domestic problems were not
present before the onset of the crises. In fact, for the
most part conditions in international financial mar-
kets, commodity markets, and the trading system
were favorable. These countries were not pursu-
ing tight anti-inflationary policies, and their real
exchange rates were only mildly overvalued because
of the persistent inflow of capital. In addition, their
overall debt-carrying capacities did not seem to pre-
sent imminent risks of default. In particular, Radelet
and Sachs find that instability in international lending
and self-fulfilling speculative attacks are the most
likely explanations for the Asian crisis in 1997.
International loan markets may be subject to self-
fulfilling crises even when individual creditors act
rationally. Changes in investors’ risk perception may
result in sharp, costly, and fundamentally unneces-
sary panicked reversals in capital flows. In this situa-
tion, exchange rates may immediately depreciate
under intense pressure. The unwillingness or inabil-
ity of the capital market to provide new loans to the
illiquid borrowers is a chief factor during crises.
Another common feature of these countries prior
to the crises was the growing weaknesses in East
Asian financial systems resulting from incomplete
markets and some market-oriented reforms, which
made the countries vulnerable to capital flight. In this
regard, the intensity and propagation of the crises
were also the result of partial banking and financial
reforms that exposed these economies more directly
to the instability of international financial markets.
Examples of bank weaknesses were the growth
of short-term foreign debt, the rapid expansion of
bank credit/lending, the inadequate regulation and
supervision of financial institutions, and the sharp
increase in the number of financial institutions and
private banks (including foreign and joint venture
banks) that could borrow or lend in foreign curren-
cies, both on- and offshore.2
These problems made the countries more vul-
nerable to a rapid reversal of capital flows that put
downward pressure on their currencies. Whereas
Radelet and Sachs (1998) find that the problems
were centered in the private sector rather than in
the government, this article finds that they were
also present in the monetary system.
Thailand. Three major currency devaluations in
Thailand occurred during the 1981:05–1981:07,
1984:11–1985:03, and 1997:07–1998:01 periods.3
These devaluations of the baht are illustrated in
Figure 1, which plots Thailand’s nominal exchange
rate in the form of logarithmic first differences
(GW_N$BAHT).
During the 1990s, capital inflows into Thailand
averaged over 10 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) and reached a remarkable 13 percent of GDP
in 1995 alone. These inflows consisted predomi-
nantly of borrowing by banks and financial institu-
tions. Throughout the decade the government fixed
the exchange rate within very narrow bands. In effect,
the central bank absorbed the risks of exchange rate
movements on behalf of investors and thus encour-
aged capital inflows, especially of short-maturity
instruments. However, increasing capital inflows put
upward pressure on the prices of nontradable goods
and services. The real effective exchange rate appre-
ciated by more than 25 percent between 1990 and
early 1997.
Indonesia. Three major currency devaluations
in Indonesia occurred in April 1983, September to
This study demonstrates that the leading indi-
cators of currency crises can be informative
tools for signaling future currency crises in
real time and could thus allow preemptive






























Thailand’s Nominal Exchange Rate




























Indonesia's Nominal Exchange Rate
Source: Datastream, International Financial Statistics database4. For example, although some series are available monthly, their release takes place two to three months later.
5. A variable is said to be (weakly) stationary if the mean and autocovariances of the series do not depend on time. Any series
that is not stationary is said to be nonstationary. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) and Phillips-Perron (1988) tests were
used to test for stationarity. In addition, Perron’s (1989) test was also used to test for nonstationarity against the alternative
of deterministic trend in the presence of sudden changes in the series.
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October 1986 (Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1996),
and August 1997 to December 1998. The devalua-
tions of the rupiah are shown in Figure 2, which plots
Indonesia’s nominal exchange rate in the form of
logarithmic first differences (GW_N$RUPIAH).
Capital inflows to Indonesia in the 1990s aver-
aged a more modest 4 percent of GDP and were
mostly in the form of borrowing by private corpora-
tions. Indonesia’s government fixed the exchange
rate subject to small and predictable changes. Here
too the government absorbed the borrowing risks
undertaken by the private sector, inducing higher
inflows of capitals. As a result, the real effective
exchange rate appreciated by more than 25 percent
between 1990 and early 1997.
Korea. The only major nominal devaluation of the
Korean won was related to the Asian crisis, which hit
the country in November 1997. Annual capital inflows
averaged over 6 percent of GDP between 1990 and
1996. The government maintained the exchange rate
with small and predictable changes and absorbed the
loan risks. The real effective exchange rate appreci-
ated by 12 percent between 1990 and early 1997.
Figure 3 plots the logarithmic first differences of
Korea’s nominal exchange rate (GW_N$WON).
Data and Statistical Analysis
S
election of candidate leading variables. In the
first triage, the variables were selected accord-
ing to several criteria, such as their frequency, sam-
ple size, and how quickly new releases of the series
were available. For these indicators to be useful for
real-time forecasting of currency crises, the variables
used should be available at least at the monthly fre-
quency and be timely.4 We found approximately ten
variables for each country as potential candidates to
predict abrupt changes in nominal exchange rates.
Several econometric procedures were then used
to select and rank the potential variables. First, all
series were transformed to achieve stationarity.5 The
variables were then classified according to their



























Korea's Nominal Exchange Rate
Source: Datastream, International Financial Statistics database30 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2004
money supply (M1), net foreign assets and private
bank foreign liabilities in billions of rupiah, and offi-
cial foreign reserves minus gold in millions of U.S.
dollars (Figure 5); and (3) for Korea, domestic
credit, net foreign assets and private bank credits
from monetary authorities in billions of won, and
the CPI (Figure 6).
These data were obtained from the International
Financial Statistics database from Datastream. The
sample available in monthly frequency covers the
1980:01–1999:06 period for Indonesia and Korea
and the 1980:02–1999:06 period for Thailand.
Nominal exchange rates are measured in U.S. dol-
lars per unit of the national currency.
The Dynamic Factor Model with 
Markov Regime Switching
T
his analysis uses a dynamic factor model with
Markov regime switching to construct the lead-
ing indicators of currency crises for Thailand,
Indonesia, and Korea.7 This model is a combination
of the linear Kalman filter and Hamilton’s (1989)
Markov regime switching model and has been widely
their ability to Granger-cause exchange rates.6
Granger causality tests select variables that have a
linear predictive content for exchange rates, but
not necessarily those that perform well in anticipat-
ing peaks and troughs in exchange rate changes.
Variables that are poor predictors of linear long-run
exchange rate variances may be significant in par-
ticular situations. Large changes in such variables
during specific historical episodes can be important
in predicting large exchange rate devaluations. For
this reason, we use probability methods to study
the nonlinear relationship of each series to deter-
mine whether it anticipates peaks and troughs of
exchange rate dynamics. In particular, different
specifications of two-state first-order Markov
switching models were fitted to each candidate
leading variable (see Chauvet and Dong 2002).
The following leading variables were selected
from both linear and nonlinear procedures: (1) for
Thailand, domestic credit, net foreign assets and
private bank credits from the central bank in bil-
lions of baht, and the consumer price index (CPI)
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Thailand: Domestic Credit, Net Foreign Assets, Private Bank Credits, and the Consumer Price Index
Source: Datastream, International Financial Statistics database6. A Granger causality test determines how much of a current time series can be explained by past values of itself and whether
adding lagged values of another series can improve the explanation.
7. A Markov process is a simple stochastic process in which the distribution of future states depends only on the present state
and not on how the present state was achieved.
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applied to business cycle studies (see, for example,
Diebold and Rudebusch 1996; Chauvet 1998; Kim
and Nelson 1998).
In this framework, the latent factor for each
country—the leading indicator—is constructed as
the common correlation underlying the country’s
leading financial variables. The motivation for this
setup is to combine the leading variables and
extract their common characteristics, which switch
regimes representing foreign exchange market
pressures. The mean and variance of the dynamic
factor are subject to discrete regime shifts governed
by a two-state Markov process. That is, the foreign
exchange market can be either under high pressure
to devaluate (state or regime 0) or under low spec-
ulative pressure (state or regime 1), with the alter-
nation between states controlled by the outcome of
the Markov process. Since the probabilistic infer-
ence on crises is based on shocks to several leading
variables used for each country, the model used
here can give more accurate signals of crises (fewer
false or missed signals) than univariate autoregres-
sive models with Markov regime switching. (See
Chauvet and Dong 2002 for further discussions.)
In-Sample Results
M
aximum likelihood estimates. Table 1
reports the maximum likelihood estimates of
the Markov-switching dynamic factor model for
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. For each country,
the analysis shows that regime 0 (high speculative
pressure) is characterized by a large variance.
For Thailand, estimation shows that the net for-
eign asset (NFA) variable is the most sensitive to
changes in the country’s leading indicator. A one-
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FIGURE 5
Indonesia: M1, Net Foreign Assets, Private Bank Foreign Liabilities, and Foreign Reserves
Source: Datastream, International Financial Statistics database32 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2004
least sensitive series to the factor, with a factor
coefficient of about 0.30 percent. The leading indi-
cator for Korea is highly persistent, with an autore-
gressive coefficient of 0.92. The volatility of the
leading indicator is about 364 times larger in the
crisis state than in the noncrisis state.
Table 2 shows that, for all three countries, the
leading indicator of currency crisis is negatively
correlated with exchange rates. That is, increases in
the level of the leading indicator are associated with
currency depreciation. The currency crises for all
countries are anticipated by the dynamic factor
behavior in state 0, that is, for the high-mean and
high-volatility regime.
Variables such as NFA, private bank credits from
the central bank, and PBFL are the most useful in
signaling speculative pressures and currency crises
in these three countries. Crises would also be antic-
ipated with a smaller lead by internal macroeco-
nomic fundamentals such as domestic credits, the
money supply, the CPI, or foreign reserves. This find-
ing supports evidence that the currency crises across
these three countries are likely to have originated in
monthly decrease in NFA of about 5 billion baht,
ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the CPI variable
is the least sensitive to changes in the leading indi-
cator. The leading indicator for Thailand is highly
persistent, with an autoregressive coefficient equal
to 0.91. In the crisis state, the volatility of the lead-
ing indicator is about 256 times larger than in the
normal or noncrisis state.
For Indonesia, the private bank foreign liabilities
(PBFL) variable is the most sensitive to changes in
the country’s leading indicator. A one-unit increase
in the factor is associated with a monthly increase
in PBFL of 2.72 percent. The reserves variable, with
a factor coefficient of 0.47 percent, is not as sensitive
as other variables. The leading indicator for Indonesia
is somewhat persistent, with an autoregressive coef-
ficient of –0.64. In the crisis state, the volatility of
the leading indicator is about 31 times greater than
in the noncrisis state.
For Korea, the NFA variable is the most sensitive
to changes in the factor; a one-unit increase in the
factor is associated with a monthly increase in NFA
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Korea: Domestic Credit, Net Foreign Assets, Private Bank Credits, and the Consumer Price Index
Source: Datastream, International Financial Statistics database33 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2004
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Note: The sample period is 1980:01–1999:06. Asymptotic standard errors (computed numerically) appear in parentheses. The factor
mean for crisis state is µˆ
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Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Dynamic Factor Model with Regime Switching
Thailand Indonesia Korea
N$RUPIAH –0.4762 N$WON –0.7083
N$BAHT –0.6471 N$BAHT –0.3022 N$BAHT –0.4076
GW_DC 0.7845 GW_M1 0.8823 GW_DC 0.4401
CH_NFA –0.6530 GW_NFA 0.2171 CH_NFA 0.0184
CH_PB 0.5089 GW_PBFL 0.4600 GW_PB 0.4148
CH_CPI 0.2304 GW_RESV 0.1911 CH_CPI 0.6318
TABLE 2
Correlation of Factor with Exchange Rate and Leading Indicators34 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2004
Figure 8 plots the dynamic factor and the proba-
bility of currency crises for Indonesia. Both are
quite stable, with values close to 0 for most of the
sample except around the currency crises. In fact,
they display abrupt oscillations in 1986–87,
1989–91, and 1997–98, anticipating the crises. In
particular, the factor and probability of currency
crises signal the currency crises in 1986:09 and in
1997:08 nine months in advance. On the other
hand, the devaluation in 1983:04 was very small.
This pattern is also reflected in the probability of
currency crises, which indicates weak speculative
pressure (around 2 percent in 1982:12). The small
probability of currency crises at the end of 1982
reinforces the view that the 1983 devaluation did
not originate from strong pressures from the finan-
cial sector and was mostly unanticipated. The
devaluation in 1986 was much larger in comparison,
and the probability of currency crises—ranging
from about 11 percent in 1986:06 to 58 percent
in 1986:09—gives clear signals of it, indicating
stronger speculative pressure. The 1997 devalua-
tion was the most severe one experienced by
Indonesia (see Figure 2). The probability of cur-
rency crises ranged from 19 percent in 1996:11 to
60 percent in 1997:01—seven months prior to the
crisis in 1997:08. After the onset of the crisis, the
probability, ranging from 15 percent in 1997:10 to
almost 100 percent in 1998:01, indicated continu-
ous speculative pressure.
One should note that the probability increased
substantially between 1989:07 and 1991:04. During
this period Indonesia underwent financial liberaliza-
tion and experienced fluctuations in capital inflow
(a deceleration in portfolio and other short-term
their respective private financial sectors and mone-
tary sectors as a result of unsustainable financial
liberalization policies.
For Thailand, in particular, acceleration in the
growth rate of domestic credits and increases in the
level of private bank credits from the central bank
and in the level of the CPI led to increases in the
leading indicator of currency crises. Hence, pres-
sures to devalue Thailand’s baht are associated with
increases in the dynamic factor and with decreases
in the level of NFA. For Indonesia, acceleration in
the growth rate of money, NFA, PBFL, and reserves
are associated with increases in the factor and,
therefore, with the devaluation of Indonesia’s rupiah.
For Korea, acceleration in the growth rate of domes-
tic credits and private bank credits from the central
bank and increases in the level of NFA and the CPI
are associated with increases in the factor and,
hence, with the devaluation of Korea’s won.
Probabilities of currency crises. Figure 7 plots
the dynamic factor (the leading indicator) and the
probability of currency crises for Thailand. The lead-
ing indicator is quite stable for most of the sample
except for the periods prior to the currency crises in
1981:05 and 1997:07, when the factor moves up and
down considerably. This pattern can also be observed
in the probability of currency crises, which increases
substantially in 1981:02 (three months before the
1981:05 currency crisis) and in 1997:01 (six months
before the 1997:07 crisis). The factor is less sensitive
to the depreciation in 1984:11, when Thailand’s
authorities abandoned the fixed exchange rate vis-à-
vis the dollar. The economy displayed stronger funda-
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Thailand: Filtered Dynamic Factor and Filtered Probability of Currency Crises
Source: Datastream, International Financial Statistics database and model results35 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2004
flows and continued growth in foreign direct invest-
ment) while interest rates decreased significantly.
However, the exchange rates did not succumb to
the high speculative pressure in 1989:07–1991:04
because the government made a preemptive policy
response to structural changes in capital inflows
(see Radelet and Sachs 1998).
Figure 9 plots the dynamic factor and probability
of currency crises for Korea. Again, the dynamic fac-
tor series is quite stable except during the currency
crisis in 1997–98. The probability of currency crisis
reflects the speculative pressure and possible conta-
gion from the crises in Thailand and Indonesia one
month earlier, in October 1997. When the deprecia-
tion of the Korean won occurred in November 1997,
the probability of currency crisis reached 100 per-
cent. As the exchange rate fluctuation continued
into early 1998, the speculative pressure measured
by the probabilistic inference reached another peak
of 100 percent in 1998:02.
Out-of-Sample Results
I
n this section we examine the performance of
inferred probabilities in predicting currency
crises in an out-of-sample exercise. We compare and
evaluate the model performance of ex post fore-
casts with real-time ex ante forecasts using only
data available at the time of the forecast. The para-
meters were estimated using data up to 1997:01.
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Indonesia: Filtered Dynamic Factor and Filtered Probability of Currency Crises
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Korea: Filtered Dynamic Factor and Filtered Probability of Currency Crises
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Thailand: In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Filtered Dynamic Factor and Filtered Probability of Currency Crises
Note: In-sample data cover the 1980:01–1997:01 period; out-of sample data cover the 1997:02–1999:06 period. The full sample covers
the 1980:01–1999:06 period.
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Indonesia: In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Filtered Dynamic Factor and Filtered Probability of Currency Crises
Note: In-sample data cover the 1980:01–1997:01 period; out-of sample data cover the 1997:02–1999:06 period. The full sample covers
the 1980:01–1999:06 period.
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Korea: In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Filtered Dynamic Factor and Filtered Probability of Currency Crises
Note: In-sample data cover the 1980:01–1997:01 period; out-of sample data cover the 1997:02–1999:06 period. The full sample covers
the 1980:01–1999:06 period.
Source: Datastream, International Financial Statistics database and model results37 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2004
out-of-sample forecasts of the filtered probabili-
ties and filtered dynamic factors. The out-of-sample
performance is analyzed for 1997:02–1999:06, which
is the period that includes the recent Asian cur-
rency crises.
The dynamic factor model with regime switching
successfully captures the crisis through the filtered
factor and filtered probability (see Figures 10, 11,
and 12). The out-of-sample filtered dynamic factors
based on data up to 1997:01 closely mimic the fac-
tors based on full-sample data up to 1999:06.
The filtered probability of currency crises for
Thailand based on information up to 1997:01 sig-
nals the country’s currency crisis in 1997:02, that
is, five months before the actual crisis occurred.
For Indonesia, the probability signals the crisis in
1997:01, seven months before the actual crisis. For
Korea, the probability signals a crisis in 1997:11,
coinciding with the actual crisis.
Conclusions
T
his article uses a dynamic factor model with
regime switching to construct leading indicators
of currency crises for Thailand, Indonesia, and
Korea. The analysis finds that most of the large cur-
rency depreciations in these countries during the
sample periods can be attributed in great part to the
deterioration of monetary and banking sector condi-
tions, which was intensified by speculative pressures.
The dynamic factor model successfully produces
early probabilistic forecasts of the Asian currency
crises, particularly the most severe one, which
occurred in 1997. These results hold for both in-
sample and recursive out-of-sample estimation.
This study demonstrates that the leading indica-
tors of currency crises can be informative tools for
signaling future currency crises in real time and
could thus allow preemptive counterpolicy mea-
sures by the central bank.
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